The Constitution and legislation provide that no public funds may be dispensed without congressional approval.
16
As for the substantive message, the marketplace model generally posits that government does not regulate information or prohibit speech, 17 and the First Amendment "does not affirmatively entitle anyone to subsidies for their speech." 18 If government funds one position and excludes others, the latter may be disadvantaged.
This Article examines how the congressional spending power and wanting oversight can abet operations that market war policies. These considerations forged a vital issue preceding the Iraq War. In its fiveyear investigation of the pre-war intelligence estimates, the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence ("SSCI") devoted a 208-page report to the Iraqi National Congress ("INC"), a group of defectors who sourced the media and U.S. intelligence services with allegations that Iraq possessed weapons of mass destruction ("WMDs") and collaborated with al-Qaeda.
19
INC publicity activities were funded by the U.S. government. 20 National Congress was that taxpayer funding was allocated to concerted efforts to promote a pro-war agenda. Id. 15. Gia B. Lee, Persuasion, Transparency, and Government Speech, 56 HASTINGS L.J. 983, 1023-24 (2005) .
16. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 7. The President must submit certain information to Congress, particularly for budget appropriations. Setty, supra note 10, at 291-92. The Antideficiency Act states that "an officer or employee of the United States Government . . . may not . . . make or authorize an expenditure or obligation exceeding an amount available in an appropriation." 31 U.S.C. § 1341(a)(1)(A) (1982 GovernmentFunded Speech, 67 N.Y.U. L. REV. 675, 680-81 (1992) (if the government "seeks to prohibit speech directly, the first amendment demands that it maintain neutrality toward content, viewpoint, and speaker identity" in order to "curb government action that threatens to skew the market-place of ideas or to indoctrinate the citizenry"); Young v. Am. Mini Theatres, Inc., 427 U.S. 50, 67 (1976) (Stevens. J., plurality opinion); Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Wis. Sys., 529 U.S. at 220-21 (1976) ; R.A.V. v. City of St. Paul, Minn, 505 U.S. 377, 382 (1992); see, e.g., United States v. Eichman, 496 U.S. 310, 317-18 (1990) ; LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW § 12-36 (2d ed. 1988 ) (also when the government delays publication of important stories, it deprives the stories of their timely news value).
18. Cole, supra note 17, at 676-78, 681 (the Court has permitted government to have some degree of influence on the content of the private speech that it is funding).
19. See generally S. SELECT COMM. ON 22 Professor Jules Lobel explained that the "war was initiated based not on reliable, tested, objective evidence, but rather on intelligence information, suspicions, surmises, or statements from defectors." 23 Chalabi was the "darling" of the Bush administration, 24 but he "gained notoriety after his group provided false information to journalists and intelligence organizations . . . before the U.S. invasion of Iraq." 25 Intricate INC involvement with U.S. government agencies actually commenced over a decade earlier. 26 Shortly after the 1991 Gulf War, President George Bush Sr. issued an order for a Central Intelligence Agency ("CIA") covert action to fashion conditions to depose the Iraqi government, which led the CIA to found an Iraqi Opposition Group within its Directorate of Operations, 27 and form the INC. 28 The INC, a congregation of three hundred affluent Whatever actually occurred during the early 1990s with Jordan did not impede the CIA from collaborating with Chalabi. 37 Chalabi became the head of the INC in June 1992 and was granted direct access to top U.S. government officials.
38
The INC located its headquarters in Washington, D.C. 39 and ostensibly was named the "Iraqi National Congress" to intimate the impression of a budding government unit.
40
Shortly after the invasion of Iraq, the U.S. military flew Chalabi into Iraq with a 600-person security force and he and other INC members lived with American Special Forces.
41
During the occupation, the investigation produced a 500-page report accusing Chalabi of making "fictitious deposits and entries to make income . . . appear larger; losses on shares and investments; [and] 
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49
The Smith-Mundt Act stated that "no funds authorized to be appropriated to the United States Information Agency shall be used to influence public opinion in the United States, and no program material prepared by the United States Information Agency shall be distributed within the United States." 50 Since 1951, Congress has typically included analogous prohibitions in appropriation bills: "[n]o part of any appropriation contained in this or any other Act shall be used for publicity or propaganda purposes within the United States not heretofore authorized by the Congress."
51 The Foreign Relations Authorization Act of 1972 banned the U.S. International Public Information Agency from disseminating any "information about the United States, its people, and its policies" prepared for dissemination within the United States.
52 Professors Palmer and Carter summarize the institutional structure: "[f]or more than fifty years, the U.S. Code has authorized the federal government to disseminate messages about America to international audiences. For at least thirty years, federal law has also prohibited those international propaganda messages from being disseminated within the United States." 191, 192 (1995) . Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 63:1 audiences was legalized, 54 while that message would be unfair or baleful to democracy if the same content was broadcasted inside the U.S. At a time when amendments to the Act were being proffered, Senator Zorinsky explained that "the American taxpayer certainly does not need or want his tax dollars used to support U.S. Government propaganda directed at him or her."
55
Indicative of the jaundiced overtone of the word, during the 1970s, U.S. officials stopped calling the circulations "propaganda" and minted the term "public diplomacy."
56 While propaganda has a negative connotation, "public diplomacy" is a communication process that attempts to "'inform, engage and influence global audiences . . . to promote greater appreciation and understanding of U.S. society, culture, institutions, values and policies.'" 57 Americans have had a constitutional right to receive information since the 1940s, 58 but First Amendment challenges to access these foreign broadcasts, generally through the same time period when the INC was formed, were largely unavailing. 849, 850 (1987 period, when it had authority over and administrative oversight over the INC, auditors found that between $2.2 out of $4.3 million in allocations could be questioned as it was placed into a black budget "classified" category and undocumented, that the organization's financial practices were plagued by "fraud, waste, and abuse," accounting methods were being comingled, it did not comply with regulations or agreements, and there was a lack of standard policies and procedures. OFFICE OF 89. Lee, supra note 15, at 1012-13 ("When the government communicates in a transparent fashion, the public understands when and how the government is injecting its views into public debate . . . . By communicating in a non-transparent manner, however, the government can make its favored positions appear more popular than they really are. . . . Multiple source influence describes the observed phenomenon that if a message is perceived to have the support of more social entities, greater persuasion will result.").
90. The operation was barely mentioned in the U.S. press, but it was the equivalent to what was happening inside the U.S. GRANDIN, supra note 64, at 229. A special top secret office was established to portray information about Iraq without heedful regard for accuracy or truth. See supra Part II.A. Former UN weapons inspector Scott Ritter also spoke about this program, mentioning that it had support from the highest levels of military and intelligence officials, and stated: "Rockingham was spinning reports and emphasizing reports that showed non-compliance (by Iraq with UN inspections) and quashing those which showed compliance. It was cherry-picking intelligence." Neil Mackay This was three months before diplomacy involving Iraq began in the United Nations and four months before Congress adopted the Authorization to Use Force Against Iraq. 94 The letter "gave the INC credit" for information "'product'" collected from "'defectors, reports, and raw intelligence,'" and for directly providing it to media sources to produce 108 Englishlanguage news stories between October 2001 and May 2002. 95 While it allocated funding for these media accounts, members of Congress were apparently unaware that INC-sponsored witnesses and reports dispensed inaccurate information. 96 However, INC-sponsored defectors were making allegations of WMDs apparently without U.S. government officials having access to those sources.
97
The DIA eventually became aware that INC data "was of little or no value," and often false. 98 In the meantime, other allegations evaded deeper scrutiny. The SSCI discovered that one part of an Intelligence Community ("IC") agency issued a "fabrication notice" or otherwise provided warnings, Nonetheless, the DIA restriction came after successions of media allegations were provided by witnesses, only some of whom were sponsored by the INC. The following are a few accounts from defectors. One week after Bush was inaugurated, an anonymous defecting Iraqi military engineer contended that " [t] here are at least two nuclear bombs which are ready for use. Before the UN inspectors came, there were 47 factories involved in the project. Now there are 64."
102 Despite the abundant number of facilities involved, the source maintained that the program was so secretive "that apart from the scientists, only four or five people know what is happening."
103 The claim also seemed implausible because UN inspectors affirmed in 1998 that there were no known active facilities in Iraq, and it can require up to a decade to enrich the uranium necessary for a nuclear bomb. 
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In mid-October 2001, a former Iraqi army captain named Sabah Khodada claimed Iraq was training terrorists to hijack planes.
105
Another anonymous defector, purportedly "a retired lieutenant general in the Iraqi intelligence service," stated that Arab students in Iraq were being taught how to hijack a Boeing 707. 106 Another source alleged that he underwent biological and chemical weapons training at secret al Qaeda camps in Iraq.
107 Abu Zeinab al-Qurairy, a former high-ranking member of the Iraqi intelligence service, claimed that the INC sponsored an imposter with his name who asserted that he worked at a terrorist camp in Iraq, called Salman Pak, where trainees learned to hijack planes. 108 The INC denied that it sponsored the source.
109
On November 8, the New York Times wrote that:
[T]wo defectors from Iraqi intelligence said yesterday that they had worked for several years at a secret Iraqi government camp that had trained Islamic terrorists . . . since 1995. They said the training in the camp, south of Baghdad, was aimed at carrying out attacks against neighboring countries and possibly Europe and the United States.
110
The article explained that the reports of the two anonymous men "mesh with statements by Sabah Khalifa Khodada Alami, a [former] captain in the Iraqi army." 122 Curve Ball recounted data for 112 U.S. intelligence reports even though only one U.S. intelligence official had apparently met him.
123 Curve Ball's descriptions were unverifiable and he could not have had current knowledge of imminent threats or the state of such a program because he had been seeking asylum in Germany for three years.
124
It appears that many sources were weaving delusive stories about Iraqi ties to 9/11 and of tremendous WMD stocks into intelligence reports and public consciousness.
125
Some information was vetted through American intelligence agencies 126 and other descriptions flowed directly into the U.S. media. The SSCI explained that the INC sponsored nineteen witnesses for the IC.
127 However, it is not possible to evaluate whether they are the same witnesses that the INC brought to the media because the SSCI identifies each of the witnesses as "Source One," "Source Two," and so on up to "Source Nineteen," to maintain confidentiality. 121. Hearings to Examine Threats, supra note 120, at 8, 15-24. 122. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 104, at 837; Bejesky, Public Diplomacy, supra note 14, at 1009-17. 123. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 104, at 838, 876. 124. Id. at 838-40, 876. 125. Id. at 817-19, 858-59, 875-77 (a series of post-invasion investigations concluded that Iraq did not have an association with al-Qaeda and that there were no WMDs or prohibited weapon programs in Iraq); Kane Pryor, A National State of Confusion, SALON, Feb. 6, 2003 , http://www.salon.com/2003 /02/06/iraq_poll_2/ (in a January 2003 poll, only 17% were correct in responding that they knew that none of the 9/11 hijackers were Iraqi, while 44% believed that "some" or "most" were Iraqi, and 33% did not know enough to form an opinion); Dana Milbank & Claudia Deane, Hussein Link to 9/11 Lingers in Many Minds, WASH. POST, Sept. 6, 2003, at A01 (69% still The JTFI procured data from defectors, intelligence collectors provided the ultimately false accounts to intelligence analysts; analysts dispensed estimates to the Bush Administration, and the Administration declassified estimates to produce allegations to the public.
154
In its investigation of circumstances preceding the formation of the JTFI, the SSCI emphasized that from 1991 to 1998 the American IC was almost wholly-reliant on United Nations ("UN") inspections for intelligence, which meant that the IC lacked sources after UN inspections ceased. 155 When UN activities concluded in 1998, inspectors did not have evidence that prohibited weapons existed and they believed that Iraq had been successfully disarmed. 156 The SSCI also ascertained that there was no "direct" evidence of WMD programs in Iraq, which was also accordant with what UN weapons inspectors kept reaffirming in their updates to the Security Council during the four months of renewed investigations immediately prior to the March 2003 attack. 157 The expanse between the lacking evidentiary foundation and the public allegations suggests that the JTFI performance could have been a product of anteceding rhetoric.
Starting This Article provides a contextspecific example and flags three controversial issues-the government funding of private publicity organizations; the distinction between government-financed messages that flow to foreign or domestic audiences; and the use of privately-constituted data on foreign policy, which can either be classified as intelligence or directly publicized in the media. These issues might be candidates for legislative initiatives to improve clarity.
First, following the 1991 Gulf War, President Bush Senior issued a covert order that led to alliances with the INC and Rendon Group. The CIA employed Ahmed Chalabi and started funding the INC with what would eventually be more than a hundred million in U.S. taxpayer dollars to "'create the conditions for removal of Saddam Hussein from power. '" 165 In Britain, the British MI6 authorized Operation Mass Appeal to disseminate inculpatory details about the Iraqi government, much of which was demonstrated to be false. 166 The second interesting facet involving the Rendon Group and the INC was the concern over fifty-year-old restrictions that condoned U.S. government-funded messages released to global audiences, but not to American citizens. 167 These Cold War-era restrictions are conspicuous in the Smith-Mundt Act of 1946, Congressional appropriations bills, and in the endeavors of the U.S. Information Agency and the Voice of as Cheney, Wolfowitz, Perle, and Feith as they shared an affinity to overthrow the Iraqi government in the late 1990s. Dizard 
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America. 168 For the INC and the Rendon Group, the theory was that U.S. government-funded stories were generated and reproduced outside U.S. territory and dispensed to foreign audiences, which made them permissible.
169
With global media operations and technological changes, experts have recently called this domestic/international distinction archaic.
170
Funding intensified with the Iraq Liberation Act of 1998 even after some government officials doubted the value of INC intelligence and the CIA had relinquished oversight. Third, INC defectors were providing stories to three recipientsthe media, the American intelligence apparatus, and government agencies. The first communication goes more directly to the public and the media decides whether to publish the "witness" account. The second type is vetted by IC analysts, who may deliver the classified information to top government officials, and top officials decide to publicly disseminate. The third is a direct disclosure to government agencies.
Perhaps the second communication has a screening mechanism that emends credibility, but it is not clear that there was much difference among the witness accounts regardless of the recipient in this case. 173 REV. 955, 969 (2007) ; Lee, supra note 15, at 985, 990, 1009 (problematic was that views were disseminated in a way that "obscured the government's role in promoting the message," apparently even by engaging in anonymous communications, to enhance credibility of the message and avoiding political accountability by "masking its identity as speaker").
173. Bejesky, Intelligence Information, supra note 104, at 875-82; see generally Part II. Syracuse Law Review [Vol. 63:1 the IC and the media; the U.S. State Department contracted to have the INC directly publicize reports in the media; and the DIA imposed contractual restrictions to maintain control over the data and prevent direct publication in the media. 174 Problems are compounded when it is not clear that there is any effective deterrent to prevent witnesses from providing inaccurate statements to these recipients.
The President also has the authority to decide what is a national security secret, what specifically must be held secret, and who can have access to that secret. 175 The Bush administration exercised significant control over that system.
176
When combined with the fact that the White House sponsored defectors and funded them to provide public accounts and controlled access to the data, this provides enormous control over discourse.
